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The process of wage bargaining has been analyzed in the literature in various ways. There is a 
strand of the  Iiterature that ignores the implicit negotiation problem and stresses on the analysis of 
wage  outcomes. 
1  Another  relevant  strand  of the  Iiterature  tries  to  model  the  strategic  bargaining 
problem and  its  solution.  Following this line,  early work focused  on  explaining why union's  wage 
demands  should  fall  during  a  conflict.
2  During  the  eighties,  the  developments  in  noncooperative 
bargaining theory help  in  explaining the  union's c1aims  by  specifying the  negotiation procedure  in 
detail.
3 For instance, Admati and Perry (1987) show that, in an incomplete information context, agents 
could  strategically delay agreements.  More  recently,  Cramton and  Tracy (1992,  1994)  consider a 
model of wage bargaining with multiple and time-varying threats. In  both cases, the formation of the 
initial  c1aim  and offer, both of which are  conditional on the  bargaining procedure,  is  described  in 
detail. 
For analyzing empirically the wage bargaining process we  have  sufficient data on  wage  and 
strike outcomes.  However, there  is  dearth of data on  the sequence of offers and counteroffers that 
agents  make.  Although  some  authors  try  to  circumvent  this  problem  by  means  of experimental 
evidence,4 to the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical work using real data on the sequence of 
offers. We dispose of a data set on initial  bargaining offers that could help us shed some light on the 
empirical relevance of  sorne features of  the bargaining process. 
In  more  detail,  we  analyze the determinants of the  union's  initial claim and the firm's  initial 
offer in the context of  a private-information model of union contract negotiations.s Assuming the firm 
has private-information about its willingness to pay, we  want to know how the union tries to screen 
this information using its first initial c1aim. From the point ofview ofthe firm offer, we would like to 
evaluate the amount of information the initial offer reveals, given the  bargaining procedure and the 
aggregate information. Furthermore, we would Iike to assess whether or not the union incorporates the 
common  knowledge  information  to  its  initial  c1aim  in  a  different  way  that  what  the  firm  does. 
Formally, our empirical approach could be  understood as an  adaptation of the Cramton and Tracy 
2 (1992, 1994) model to the current Spanish bargaining structure. However, the analysis is conditional 
on  particular characteristics of the collective bargaining and the bargaining procedure in  Spain. This 
is  such that, after a given union's initial, the firm  is  forced to  counteroffer before a given deadline 
(usually a week after the c1aim was made). In  such circumstance, the offer reveals little information 
regarding the firm  (for instance,  in  1987, 47.0  per cent of the offers were equal to the nationwide 
employers association reference offer), as against what we find in Cramton and Tracy framework. 
This empirical  exercise  is  carried out using a  sample of large  firms  from  the "Negociación 
Colectiva en  las  Grandes Empresas en  España" (NCGE), a yearly survey on bargaining and other 
issues conducted by the Spanish Ministry ofEconomy. It provides data on initial bargaining positions, 
negotíation  timing,  strike activity, wage increase settlements and other relevant economic variables 
(see the Appendix). 
The rest of the paper goes as follows.  In  section 11  we describe the most relevant features and 
figures of the Spanish negotiation framework. The empirical model and the econometric specification 
are described in section III. The main results are presented in section IV. Finally, section V conc1udes. 
11. Spanish negotiation framework and data. 
a.  Spanish negotiationframework. 
Bargaining procedures in  Spain, as  in  other European countries, are quite different from those 
in  the US  or Canada.
6  Bargaining occurs at  industry-wide and  firm  levels simuitaneously, terms of 
industry-wide  agreements  being  a  binding  floor  for  all  firms  in  the  sector,  Le.,  the  so-caBed 
"mandatory extension" principie. Union's affiliation is low but its power is high because unions carry 
negotiations at  industry-wide leve!.  The coverage of the system is  notably high.  During the period 
1984-91, almost 82  per cent of all employees were covered by collective agreements and 20 per cent 
ofthese correspond to firm-Ievel agreements in large firms. 
Most employees have indefinite contracts. Current working and payment conditions are settled 
in  an  additional protocol called "convenio colectivo" which stipulates the wages and hours of work 
3 over a  number of years.  However,  wage  increases are  negotiated or renegotiated on  a  near yearly 
basis. Elected works councils substitute unions in firm-level negotiations and, as a major difference to 
other European countries, can can for a strike. It seems that the main motivation of the decision to 
negotiate at the firm-level  bargaining in  Spain  is  to distribute firm-specific quasi-rents (Palenzuela 
and Jimeno, 1996). 
The negotiation at the firm-level  proceeds as fonows. It starts when the council makes a wage 
increase claim.  The institutional  setting is  such that the  firm  must counteroffer immediately or,  at 
least, before a given deadline. If  this offer equals the aboye c!aim, there is an immediate agreement. If 
not, they alternate offers until they reach an  agreement. Meanwhile, the council uses a latent strike 
threat. However, it is  unusual to can for a strike before both the c!aim and the offer are made, Le. the 
wage  increase platform  is  announced.  Additionally,  both  of the  agents  involved  receive aggregate 
(and  industry)  signalling.  At  the  aggregate  level,  the  employers  association  recommends  to  its 
members an  initial  offer (reference offer,  RO).  Likewise,  nationwide  unions  recommend an  initial 
claim (reference claim, RC) to their works council members. 
b. Aggregate and sample evidence about wage bargaining 
In  Table  1 we  summarize sorne  characteristics of the negotiation process  in  the NCGE and 
sorne  aggregate determinants during  1982-1993.  During the period  1982-86, with the  exception of 
1984,  there were annual  nationwide agreements which  guided firm-level  negotiations. Nationwide 
agreements fixed a wage change band which acted as a reference point in fixing industry or firm level 
settlements.  From  1987,  there  have  not  been  any  nationwide  agreements,  but  the  nationwide 
employers association and the most powerful unions have  respectively announced yearly reference 
offers and claims.
7 Note that (comparing the first and the second period mentioned) the existence of 
an aggregate agreement in a given year reduces the length ofthe negotiation process at the firm-Ievel. 
Notice also that for the entire period, the level of conflicting activity has been significantly low. This 
is a consequence of both, a very low conditional duration of strikes (not higher than five days) and a 
strike incidence between 10 and 15 per cent.
8 In Figure 1 we plot the observed (average) initial claim, 
4 initial offer and agreement against the inflation rate in  1982-1993. The persistent difference between 
both  initials  highlights  the  presence  of sorne  kind  of private  information  regarding  the  level  of 
profitability of firms.  FinaHy, we must point out that, with one exception (1987), the inflation rate is 
higher than the inflation target fixed by the government. 
In Table 2 we distinguish four distinct types of outcomes of the bargaining process. The most 
common outcome (column 1) implies an unknown sequence of  alternating offers after a works council 
initial  claim  and  a  firm's  initial  offer (that  is,  at  least  three  offers  are  necessary  in  reaching  an 
agreement). It shows strike incidence of 16  per cent and a negotiation length of slightly aboye three 
months. The other three types of outcomes (columns 2 to 4) are related to initial claims and/or initial 
offers accepted. In  aH  these cases both the strike incidence and the  length of negotiation are lower 
than  in  regular  disagreement  outcomes.  As  expected,  the  lowest  strike  incidence  and  length  of 
negotiation  is  achieved  when  the firm  accepts the  union's  initiaJ  claim (column 2).  Notice also the 
relatively high  strike  incidence when  work councils get  initial  claim  but only after being initial1y 
rejected.  This type of outcome implies that works council's wage concession curves are horizontal 
with respect to the length of negotiations. 
Table 3 provides further  information about how  initial positions are generated. Both of them 
are,  in a great majority of cases, aboye their respective reference offers. With respect to firm offers, 
several comments are in  order. First,  it  seems that any initial firm  offer must be (to be credible) as 
high  as  the  RO,  which  is  closely related  to  the  government's  inflation  target.  Second,  there  is  an 
important fraction of offers that coincide with the RO, which in  turn has very little information about 
the true demand state of the firmo  In  regard to offers below or aboye the RO,  we pose the foHowing 
empirical question: do they signal to the works council the demand state of the firm or do they reflect 
the influence of the  observables (either aggregate or bargaining unit  information)? On  the part of 
works council claim, there is also an  important fraction of claims which coincides with the RC. Note 
also the increase in the fraction of claims from that faH  below the RC  as this may reflect a change of 
strategy on part of the employees. 
5 Finally, in Figure 2, we show, year by year, the relationship between the initial claim and offer 
and  the  nationwide reference  points:  that of the employers'  association (vertical  line)  and  that of 
nationwide unions (horizontalline). Two clear pattems arise. On the one hand, the fraction of claims 
below the Re is greater in the latter part ofthe sample periodo While on the other, the fraction of  offer 
below the RO decreases in  the latter part of the sample periodo  On the other hand, note that there is 
little  relationship  between  claim  and  offers  in  any  of the  years  considered  implying  that  works 
councils' claims have limited influence in employers' offers. 
111. Economic and econometric framework. 
As  mentioned  before, the Spanish bargaining framework  is  such that bargaining starts at the 
time the works council makes an  initial wage c!aim,  w~  (in logs).  In  signaling models, the claim is 
assumed to  be a function  of what the un ion  (works councils  in  our case) expects a  unit of labor is 
worth for the firm (q/l ) and, simultaneously, other reduced-form determinants Xi/.  Formally: 
t=l,  ...,T¡ ;i=l,...,N  [1] 
where  f/  is  a  firm  specific  component  and  Ui~  is  a  serially  uncorrelated  error  termo  The  main 
prediction  from  signalling  models  is  such  that  ac  must  be  positive.  That  is,  higher  expected 
profitability implies higher expected claim. 
On the part of the firm,  the underline initiaJ  wage offer,  w¡~,  is  made taking into account the 
aboye claim, knowing the true value of q¡/ 
t=l,  ...,T¡ ;i=l,...,N  [2] 
where  ¡;O  is a firm specific component and  u~  is a serially uncorrelated error termo  After the claim 
has being announced, the firm decides either to accept such a claim or make, before a formal deadline 
(at time k), a counteroffer, (w~  ), which is related to the underline offer in the following way: 
6 W~  =Wi~  if  w~ ~w~ 
[3] 
°  C  if  O1,O't >W,C't WiI=Wi¡  1'1' 
Consequently, the observed initial offer is censored from aboye by the initial c1aim. Note that 
those  observations  in  which  the  c1aim  has  been  accepted  are  very  Iittle  informative  about  the 
underline  offer.  In  that  case,  we  should  proceed  is  to  restriet  the  estimation  sample  to  those 
observations in which the claim has been rejected (informative offers) while considering the selection 
induced by  the rejection of the initial c1aim.  However, given the fact that the censoring oecurs in  a 
very Iittle fraction of cases (less than four per cent of the cases), we proceed as there are no censoring 
problems,  i.e., 
°- C  fJ  X  f.o  o • W,t -YoW it +aoqit +  °  it  +  i  +Uit '  if Sil =0  [4] 
where Sil= 1 ifthe initial c1aim is accepted by the firm and zero otherwise. 
The characteristies of the  Spanish  bargaining structure restricts the kind of theoretical model 
we  can  take  as  a reference.  For instance,  having at  least one offer from  each agent (without fixed 
intervals  between offers), we  may  reject both a screening model  in  which the  union  makes all  the 
offers (Hayes,  1984, and Card,  1990) and an  alternating offers model with a fixed  interval  between 
offers (Grossman  and  Perry,  1986,  and  Kennan  and  Wilson,  1989).  Recently Cramton and  Traey 
(1992 and 1994) have proposed a signalling model with multiple threats or time-varying threats that is 
adequate to represent, at least partially, the underlining negotiation structure of  our data. 
In  the first work mentioned, when the  counteroffer is  made at a freely chosen time, say  r,  it 
reveals all  the  prívate information of the  firmo  In  fact the counteroffer is  a Rubinstein offer and  is 
immediately accepted by  the union.  In  such cireumstances, the offer is  fulIy  informative. However, 
the  Spanish  institutional  setting  is  such  that  firms  must counteroffer  immediately or,  in  any  case, 
before a given deadline, say at time k.  Consequently, we do not expect the firm offer to reveal much 
of  the firm information. Thus, in the Spanish case, the offer is, in  most of the cases, non-informative. 
Consequently,  the  key  eoefficient of the  offer equation,  ao.  must be  close  to  zero.  Note  that for 
coherency Yo  must be also close to zero. AdditionalIy, both the c1aim and the offer are expected to be 
7 related, possibly  in  a very different manner, with both aggregate and firm  specific variables, all of 
them which are in the vector X 
In  essence, our c1aim  and offer equations may  be considered as standard wage equations and 
consequently, we can specify a dynamic structure for them. Learning or reputation may influence the 
current outcome of the  negotiation  process.  Additionally,  a  single  negotiation  is  embedded  in  an 
indefinite  negotiation  process.  Thus,  current  negotiation  cannot  be  isolated  from  past  (or  future) 
negotiation rounds. 
Given that the c1aim and offer data are not in  levels, but are expressed as arate of change, we 
can rewrite a dynamic version ofboth equations as: 
Notice that  in  the  latter case, the  relevant sample  is  constructed  by  picking  up  at  least two 
consecutive outcomes in which the initial claim is rejected. The sample constructed in such a way will 
be denoted as the offer sample. 'o  Líkewíse, the original sample will be denoted as the claim sample. 
Regardíng the estímatíon of equations [5] and [6] -ignoríng the potential censoring problem- there are 
several important considerations. First, the unobservability of qu, the union's expectation about how 
worthy is  a unit of work for the firmo  We assume that agents are rational and following McCallum 
(1976) and Wickens (1982), we replace  qu  by  qu  and use  instrumental variable methods. Second, 
least  squares  in  any  of both  equations  may  produce  inconsistent  estimates  as  long  as  there  are 
variables potentially correlated with either the error term or the idiosyncratic heterogeneity effect. We 
take into account both problems, not using a IV estimator over the first-differenceD equations of [5] 
and [6], but the (two-stage) estimation method proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). This estimator 
largely improves the performance of the first-differenced method alone, as recently noted by Blundell 
and  Bond  (1995).  This  method,  in  addition  to  the  orthogonality  restrictions  implied  by  the  first-
differenced  equations  {E(~u7tziS),k =c,o;t > s + l;t =3,..,T¡} ,  also  exploits  the  orthogonality 
restrictions  among  the  error  in  either  [5]  or  [6]  with  all  the  predetermined  instruments 
8 {E(u~¿jzjs),k=c,o;t>s;t=3, .. ,T¡} . A Sargan (1988) test evaluates the  validity of the orthogonality 
restrictions employed. 
9￿ IV. Empirical results. 
a.  Data and variables 
As mentioned in section 1,  the basic data source we use in  the NGCE, an annual survey which 
offers  information about collective bargaining of firms with more than two hundreds workers.  The 
available sample covers a time span of 7 years, from  1985 to  1991. From the raw data set we select 
those observations which contain information about c1aim, offer, agreement, and the starting and the 
ending date  of the  negotíation  process.  The  basic  statistics  of this  data  set  are  presented  in  the 
Appendix. 
We distinguish three groups of variables: those which correspond to specific c.haracteristics of 
the bargaining unit, those which refer to sorne features of the current or previous bargaining process 
and those which capture aggregate effects. 
In the first group, the value added per employee is  included as a proxy for the firm's demando It 
is  expected  to  push  up  the  initial  claim  and  to  have  Iittle  (null)  effect  over the  offer,  given  the 
characteristics of the  Spanish bargaining framework.  In  addition, we  also inc1ude the percentage of 
sales in the local market as an indirect measure of  competitive pressure. 
Furthermore,  in  this  group  we  also  include  a  set  of variables  which  account  for  potential 
differences between union  power: the  percentage of the workers within the council which belong to 
CCOO and  UGT (the two most  important  nationwide unions),  to  middle sized unions,  to  regional 
unions and small groups of representatives (other groups inc/uding professional unions are omitted). 
We also consider a dummy which takes into account the presence of a single union within the works 
counci/. This is because a single union within the works council has no coordination problems and, as 
a result, could have a greater negotiatíon power. The size of the bargaining unit is controlled by the 
lagged number of employees. We also inc/ude the concession of a cost of living allowance c/ause in 
the previous year agreement.  In  order to capture the effect of the negotiation timing, we  inc/ude a 
dummy  if the  negotiation  process  starts  after  the  expiration  of the  last  agreement  about  wage 
increases. 
At the aggregate level we distinguish between industrial and  nation-wide effects. We  inc/ude 
10 the number of  days lost by strike per employee in the industry which acts as a proxy for the aggregate 
bargaining pressure. An increase in the industry (or nationwide) unemployment rate or a decrease in 
the change of the industry employment level can be expected to lower both the claim and the offer. 
Higher the expected level of inflation,11  higher are expected to be both initials, as far as sufficiently 
many agent think of inflation as the minimum guaranteed wage change.12 
Moreover, we also inc1ude the mean negotiated wage change settlement in the same region (or 
combination of regions,  in  the  case  of a  multiplant  bargaining  unit)  in  the  previous  month.  This 
variable proxies information that agents have about other bargaining units actions and could capture 
spillover effects (see McConnell, 1989). It should contribute to the improvement of our specification 
in  at least two  directions.  First,  it  offers  sorne  demand  information  not directiy observable to the 
econometrician at the regional levels.  Second, other firms'  wage settlements may enter directly into 
wage negotiations through the reservation wage and/or the profit function. The former variables are 
dated at the beginning of the negotiation process in the claim and offer equations and are expected to 
put upward pressures over the outcome. 
Fina11y,  nationwide  unions  and  employers  associatíon  prescriptíons  and  aggregate 
unemployment  variables  (national  rate  of unemployment  and  national  long-term  unemployment) 
should playa crucial role in our proposal. They are expected to c10sely drive firm-Ievel  initial offers. 
Notice that these variables, which only have time series varíation, are not identified when inc1uding 
time dummies as regressors. A set of industry dummies is also inc1uded. 
b.  Resu/ts. 
In  Table 4 we present the resuits of the estimation of the c1aim  and offer equations using the 
GMM-IV  method  proposed  by  Arellano and Bover (1995).  We  report the results of two different 
specifications  for  each  equation.  A11  the  equations  pass  the  standard  testing  procedures.  In  aH 
columns, we  found  absence of the second order autocorrelation  in  the  first  differences  error term 
(which implies that the level error is  white noise). Likewise, aH  of them pass the Sargan (1988) test 
for the validity ofthe instruments. For coherency, the same set of instruments -except for that we did 
not inc1ude the lags ofthe offer in the c1aim equation-has been employed in all the equations. 
11 [insert Table 4 here] 
As expected, the value added per employee plays a different role depending on the equation we 
considero  It  has a positive effect on  the  initial c1aim,  Le.,  the unions translate increases in expected 
productivity into  increases  in  their initial c1aims.  On the contrary, the effect on the  initial offer is 
statistically insignificant, a result which is expected given the structure of the bargaining process in 
Spain.  Moreover, this key result remains unchanged when we assume the firm to be fully  informed 
about q, that is, when we do not instrument the value added per employee in the offer equation. Thus, 
due to the short period in which the firms have to counteroffer, their initial offers do not reveal any 
information about their true situations. 
Regarding dynamic and contemporary cross effects, we found  a negligible coefficient for the 
dynamic term in the c1aim equation and a positive and significant dynamic effect in the offer equation. 
Both  results  are  consistent with  the fact  that the  works  council  c1aims  intends to screen  the  firm 
information  and the firm  offer tries  not to  reveal  such information.  As  expected, the effect of the 
current claim on the current offer is unimportant. Moreover, the latter effect totally vanishes when we 
do not instrument the value added per employee, that is, when we assume the firm has no uncertainty 
on  the  value  added  per  employee.  From  our  point of view,  this  supports  the  following  working 
hypothesis: the c1aim is less related to the observable information than the offer. Later in this section, 
we add more evidence to this particular hypothesis. 
As  in  the standard wage equation estimates for the Spanish economy,13  both claim and offer 
depend strongly on aggregate conditions. The effect of aggregate variables is even more prominent in 
the case of the offer equation. Regarding the effect of the aggregate employers association initial is 
higher in the offer equation than in the c1aim equation, whereas the reverse result is obtained for the 
aggregate union's initial. 
The effect of the  national  unemployment  rate  is  more  important  than  that of the  industry 
unemployment rateo On the other hand, the nationallong-term unemployment rate has different effects 
in both equations. It has a positive effect in the offer equation, thereby reducing the stabilization role 
of the unemployment rate, as it was found  in  sorne studies when estimating wage equations for the 
12 Spanish economy.14 The effect ofthis variable is  insignificant in the claim equation. 
With  respect  to  other  aggregate  variables  we  must  point  out  that  the  level  of industry 
conflicting activity reduces the degree of  disagreement (reduces the claim and increases the offer, the 
former effect being greater in absolute value).15 The effect of the expected level of inflation is similar 
and  highly  significant  in  both  equations.  However,  the  (average)  wage  change  negotiated  at  the 
regionallevel (which proxies for the available information at the starting ofthe bargaining process) is 
significant in the offer equation but not in the claim equation. 
It is also important to note that many observables referred to the characteristic ofthe bargaining 
unit enter differently, in size and/or in sign, in the two equations considered. Note that when the effect 
of a given variable has an opposite sign in the two initial offer equations, we can jointly interpret the 
two  coefficients  in  terms  of the  degree  of disagreement  (i.e.,  the  difference  between  claim  and 
offer).16  In  that  sense,  the degree  of disagreement decreases  when  the  negotiations  start after the 
expiration of the former agreement, since there is  less uncertainty and, increases with the size of the 
bargaining unit. The joint effect of union variables seems to indicate that the degree of disagreement 
decreases the more  important is the presence of the powerful union groups within the works council. 
Finally, as expected, having indexed the previous agreement (which proxies the likelihood of getting 
indexation in the current negotiation), has a negative effect on both equations, larger in  absolute value 
in the c1aim equation. 
V. Summary of findings and main conclusions 
Throughout this paper we have  analyzed c1aim  and offer setting using Spanish data from  the 
NCGE.  We  have  tried  to  assess  how  the  initial  offers  are  formed.  The  analysis  has  considered 
carefully the econometric methods and testing procedures that this kind of  data requires. 
Since  both  initials  must  be  announced  at the  very  beginning of the  bargaining process,  we 
found that the works council claim tries to screen the level of profitability of the firmo  Furthermore, 
we found that the firm offer does not reveal (on average) any of the firm information. In addition, the 
effect of aggregate variables seems to be more important for the initial offer than for the initial claim. 
13 At  the  same  time,  employers  and  employees  use  the  information  from  the  bargaining  unit 
characteristics in a very different way. 
Furthermore, both the initial claim and the initial offer are relatively more closely related to 
aggregate setting than to  firm  conditions.  This  il1ustrates the fact that the  current system  of wage 
bargaining leads to an  inflationary bias.
l 
?  This constitutes c1ear evidence in  favor of the existence of 
sorne sort of wage rigidity in  Spain caused, among other reasons, by the combination of the structure 
ofthe collective bargaining system and high firing costs for perrnanent workers. 
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------------r-------------------------------------Notes. 
ITypical  examples  are the  Efficiency  Wages  model  [Solow (1979)]  and  also the  Insider-Outsider  model  [￿ 
Solow (1985) and Lindbeck and Snower (1986)].￿ 
2See Kennan (1986) for a detailed survey ofearlier work.￿ 
31n  a  crucial  work,  Rubinstein  (1982)  showed  that  the  altemating  offers  game  with  complete￿ 
information  has  a  unique  subgame  perfect  equilibrium  in  which  the  first  offer  is  accepted.  [See￿ 
Binrnore et al. (1992) for a survey oftheoretical work and Kennan and Wilson (1989 and 1993) for a survey of￿ 
both theoretical and applied wage bargaining work.]￿ 
4See Kennan and Wilson for (1993) for a recent survey.￿ 
5 See Fudenberg, Levine and Ruud (1983), Morton (1983) and Hayes (1984) for earlier asymmetric models on￿ 
wage negotiation and strike activity.￿ 
6See Jimeno and Toharia (1994) for a description ofthe Spanish industrial relations system.￿ 
7For  instance,  for  1998  a press release (Expansion,  01/15/98) from  the main  employers association￿ 
(CEOE) states:  "The employers association CEOE recommends to the employers a 1.1  per cent wage￿ 
increase  for  the  1998  Collective Bargaining  round,  \.0  per  cent  below  the  govemment's  inflation￿ 
target. The employers association also advises to its affiliations affiliated not to accept any agreement￿ 
regarding wage hours and temporary contracts."￿ 
8See Jimenez-Martin et al. (1996) for an empirical analysis of strike incidence in Spain using the same￿ 
data set.￿ 
9We,  instead, could have  assumed a weaker assumption: the firm  is  more  informed than employees￿ 
about q.￿ 
10ln general, we should take into account that  E(uft/LJwi~ >LJwft)  is not expected to be zero. However,￿ 
when the censoring is very small (as in our case) the problem has a limited impact. In our case, similar￿ 
qualitative  and  quantitative  results  are  obtained  independent1y  of the  sample  employed  (either the￿ 
offer or the claim sample).￿ 
11In order to proxy the expected level ofinflation we use an ARIMA forecast ofthis variable.￿ 
18 12The data show that agreements are in a great proportion above the expected level of inflation. In fact they are￿ 
in many cases best linked to government target.￿ 
13See Andres et al. (1993) for a survey of  empirical results for wage equations in Spain.￿ 
14 See Andres and Garcia (1993) and Dolado and Bentolila (1994).￿ 
15Although there are several studies that inc1ude  a measure of aggregate strike activity in  firm-Ievel￿ 
wage negotiations (Card (1990) is an example), the process of  transmision from sectoral to firm level￿ 
negotiations it is still unc1ear.￿ 
I~ote  that  a  greater level  of disagreement  has  strong consequences  in  the  rest of the  bargaining￿ 
process.  For instance,  as  illustrated by Jimenez-Martin et al.  (1996),  it  increases the  likelihood of￿ 
observing a strike during the negotiation.￿ 
17In  words of Blanchard et al.  (1995):  "In the current system, each level of bargaining establishes a￿ 
floor on the wages which can be set at the 10wer leve!. Sectoral-Ievel bargaining in effect sets a wage￿ 
floor on  firm-Ievel  agreements, which can either set wages at the floor,  or at a higher level. Thus,￿ 
firms which are doing well can pay higher wages, but firms which are not doing so well are prevented￿ 
from paying lower wages. The result is a wage setting system with an  inflationary bias. rhe problem￿ 
is  likely to  be  particulariy acute  in  times when more re-allocation is  needed, as  has been the case in￿ 
Spain with the rapid increase in openness and foreign trade."￿ 
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20 Table 1. Bargaining determinants and outcomes. 
AGGREGATE  NCGESAMPLE 
BARGAINING  BARGAINING OUTCOMES  INFLA nON 
nationwide  RO  RC  ciaim  offer  agree  eneg  estrike  Target  CPI 
year  Agreement  %  %  % % %  days  /lOurs  % % 
1982  Ves  9  11  13.0  9.0  11.02  73  4.6  12.5  14.0 
1983  Ves  9.5  12.5  15.0  9.0  11.5  65  4.2  12.0  12.2 
1984  No  6.5 to 8  10  10.0  5.0  7.9  87  10.2  8.0  9.0 
1985  Ves  5.5  7.5  9.3  5.9  8.3  75  3.0  7.0  8.1 
1986  Ves  5.2  8.5  . 10.2  6.8  8.7  117  2.0  8.0  8.3 
1987  No  5.0  8.0  8.7  4.9  7.0  96  6.0  5.0  4.8 
1988  No  3 to 5  6  7.8  4.2  5.7  150  2.0  3.0  5.8 
1989  No  3 to 6  7  8.8  4.2  6.2  157  4.7  3.0  6.9 
1990  No  5  9  10.1  5.3  7.5  131  2.7  5.7  6.5 
1991  No  5 to 7  9  10.6  5.7  7.6  121  6.7  5.0  5.5 
1992  No  3 to 5  8  9.0  5.8  6.8  133  3.7  5.0  5.3 
1993  No  2 to 5  5+  6.5  3.6  4.7  262  1.2  4.5  4.9 
RO:  From 1982 to 1986 (except in  1984), lower bound ofthe nationwide recornmended agreement bando￿ 
Since 1987, nationwide employer's recommended reference offer.￿ 
RC:  From 1982 to 1986 (except in 1984), upper bound ofthe nationwide recommended agreement bando￿ 
Since 1987, nation wide union's recommended reference c1aim.￿ 
1_neg: average length of  negotiations.￿ 
I_strike: Unconditional average number ofhours lost by strikes.￿ 
Target: Goverment's inflation target.￿ 
CPI: December to December Consumer Price Index.￿ 
sources: NCGE and Circular para la Negociación Colectiva, Employers Association, 1994.￿ 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for different types of agreement. 
Regular Olltcome  jirst ultio"  jirst  First 
Claim>  ciaim accepted  jirms'  U"ion 
Agree>  aftera  offer  Claim 
Offer  cOllllteroffer  accepted  Accepted 
Claim  10.1  7.4  9.4  7.1 
Agreement  7.0  7.4  6.5  7. I 
Offer  5.2  5.8  6.5  7.1 
Strike illcidence  17.0  11.9  6.4  3.1 
Lengtil oflIegotiatiolls  100.7  95.7  74.6  47.5 
Observations  1861  42  171  97 
(per ce"t)  (85.1 )  (1.9)  (7.7)  (4.4) 
Table 3. Claim and offer distribution with respect to reference initials. 
Offer  Claim 
Year  O<RO  O=RO  O>RO  C<RC  C=RC  C>RC 
1985  17.2  17.3  65.5  4.8  19.3  75.9 
1986  15.2  0.0  84.8  13.0  14.5  72.5 
1987  18.6  47.0  34.4  20.6  25.9  53.5 
1988  4.5  16.4  79.1  8.7  11.0  80.3 
1989  1.4  13.3  85.3  39.7  18.7  41.6 
1990  13.5  16.2  70.3  23.2  27.1  49.7 
1991  8.7  29.5  61.8  25.3  30.7  44.0 
Notes: See below Table l. 
21 Figure 2. Claim and Offer and aggregate initials in 1985-1991. 
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Notes:  RO: Nationwide employers' association reference offer. Re: Nationwide unions' reference claim. 
22￿ Table 4. Initial c1aim and offer determination. 
CLAIM  CLAIM  OFFER  OFFER 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
coef. t-st.  coef. t-st.  coef. t-st.  coef. t-st. 
constant  -0.4930 (0.11)  -7.4107 (1.85)  2.0382 (0.92)  -11.716 (5.51) 
lagged claiml  -0.0058 (0.40)  -0.0002 (0.01) 
lagged offerl  0.2172 (9.09)  0.1970 (7.94) 
current claimtl  0.0177 (1.54)  0.0222 (1.87) 
change in value addedt  0.5536 (3.30)  0.5158 (3.11)  -0.0744 (1.37)  -0.0029 (0.05) 
% ofsales in the domestic market  0.0668 (0.17)  0.0187 (0.05)  0.0995 (0.78)  0.0990 (0.72) 
a single union at the works eouncil  -0.2926 (1.08)  -0.3012 (1.14)  0.1212 (0.94)  0.2210 (1.63) 
% ofrep.  ofCeDO at the we  -0.0102 (0.01)  0.0970 (0.17)  0.4351  (1.80)  0.6311 (2.75) 
% ofrep ofregional unions at the we  -1.7493 (2.78)  -1.6504 (2.66)  0.2940 (1.16)  0.4603 (1.89) 
% ofrep ofUGTat the we  -0.7444 (1.49)  -0.7001 (1.42)  0.3910 (1.65)  0.5457 (2.42) 
% ofsmall groups at the we  -0.4593 (0.84)  -0.3725 (0.69)  0.1732 (0.75)  0.3488 (1.55) 
lagged strike duration  -0.0152 (1.14)  -0.0136 (1.04)  -0.0076 (2.05)  -0.0070 (1.84) 
bargaining started with delay  -0.0799 (0.59)  -0.1760 (1.38)  0.2447 (4.05)  0.2333 (3.69) 
COLA signed in the last agreement  -0.4163 (2.79)  -0.5002 (3.44)  -0.1303 (2.14)  -0.2122 (3.44) 
lagged employmentl  0.7190 (2.66)  0.7076 (2.67)  -0.3355 (4.52)  -0.1680 (2.16) 
lagged wagel  0.1960 (0.49)  -0.0493 (0.12)  0.3089 (1.13)  0.0097 (0.03) 
lagged (twiee) wagel  -0.3618 (2.30)  -0.2943 (1.81)  0.0241 (0.55)  0.1172 (2.33) 
industry strike eonjlieting aetivity  0.2736 (3.51)  0.2562 (3.33)  0.0672 (3.66)  0.0471 (2.02) 
industry unemployment rate  -0.1404 (0.54)  -0.1715 (0.67)  0.1231 (1.52)  -0.1153 (1.91) 
ehange in the industry employment  0.4090 (1.29)  0.1385 (0.20)  -0.5678 (1.34)  0.0638 (0.94) 
Expeeted level ofinjlation  0.2945 (4.16)  0.3849 (8.00)  0.2610 (7.45)  0.3879 (11.6) 
regional wage ehange signal  0.0512 (1.30)  0.0497 (1.27)  0.0907 (4.94)  0.0811 (4.30) 
nationwide employers referenee offer  0.4444 (6.08)  0.4657 (9.15) 
nationwide union 's referenee claim  0.1261 (1.36)  0.1294 (2.64) 
nationwide unemployment rate  -2.3301  (1.95)  -2.7426 (4.69) 
nationwide long term unemployment  0.0343 (1.59)  0.1131 (6.60) 
Speci(ieatioll test 
Wald (dj)  (19)  567.5(23)  (20)  1504.4(24) 
industry dummies (dj)  28.7(7)  31.3(7)  24.1 (7)  26.9(7) 
time dummies (dj)  109.2(5)  No  424.2(5)  No 
Sargan (dj)  93.47 (90)  98.3 (90)  108.4(106)  123.1(106) 
fose  -2.03  -2.02  -5.73  -5.80 
fose  0.40  -0.37  -1.22  -1.44 
Notes: Absolute value t-statistics in brackets. 
The variables marked t have  been  instrumented.  Instruments:  Z"Z'.4 for  first  differences equations and  Z"ZI_4  for￿ 
level equations.￿ 
Wald: Wald test ofthe null that the vector ofcoefficients (exc1uding time and industry dummies) is zero.￿ 
Sargan: Test of the validity of the set of instruments used.  Under the null of adequacy, the test is  distributed as a￿ 
:ir, where r is the number of  overidentilYing restrictions.￿ 
fose (sosc): Test ofthe absence offirst (second) order serial correlation in the error terrn (Arellano and Bond, 1991).￿ 
23 Appendix. Data and variables. 
The  data  used  in  this  study  comes  from  the  NCGE,  an  annual  survey  about  bargaining  in 
Spanish large firms  (more than 200 employees).  Each wave  provides  information about firm  main 
results  (sales,  value  added  and  profits),  employment structure  and  negotiation  by  bargaining unit. 
Despite the survey runs  since  1978  we  only have  information for the  period  1985-1991.  From the 
original  database,  we  have  excluded  those  firms  that  do  not  report  information  about  sorne  key 
variables such value added, employment, wage increase agreement, initial positions and length of the 
negotiation. The summary statistics, the definition and the source -when necessary- of the variables 
employed are also reported in Table A.l. 
Table A.l. Variables. Descriptive statistics, definition and source. 
Claim sample  Ofler Sample
Q 
Variables  Mean  st dev  Mean  st dev  Dejinition (when necessary) 
Inítialoffers and agreement 
Claim  9.835  4.588  10.00  4.690  works council first wage increase c1aim(%) 
Of[er  5.423  1.633  5.333  1.500  firm's first wage increase offer (%) 
Firm variables. 
Value addedper employee  8.563  0.757  8.562  0.750  (in logs) 
% ofsales in the domestic marlcet  86.6  20.8  86.3  21.1  in percentage 
Bargaining unit variables 
A single union at the works council  10.9  31.20  10.2  30.2  dummy (1 =single union at the works council) 
%ofrep.ofCCOOatthewc  36.4  25.10  36.80  24.90  in percentage 
% ofrep ofregional unions at wc  05.5  14.20  5.70  14.40  in percentage 
% ofUGT at the wc  30.6  22.40  3050  22.10  in percentage 
% ofsmall groups at the wc  21.2  27.70  20.50  26.90  in percentage 
Lagged strilee duration  0.157  0.364  0.163  0.369  lagged strike days per emp10yee 
Bargaining startedwith delay  24.5  43.0  23.0  42.1  1 if  negotiation starts after the expiration ofthe 
last agreement 
Lagged COLA signed  74.90  43.40  74.80  43.40  COLA: 1 ifthe last agreement has a COLA 
Lagged employment level  6.418  1.128  6.434  1.100  number of  employees in the BU (in logs) 
Laggedwage  8.298  0.39  8.300  0.39  wage bill per emp10yee (in logs) 
Other variables. 
Working days lost per employee  0.445  1.026  0.458  1.063  industry averages -44 industries. (source: BEL) 
Industry unemployment rate  13.45  7.930  13.55  8.050  in percentage -44 industries. (source: EPA) 
Change in industry employment  0.025  0.066  0.025  0.065  44 industries (source: EPA) 
E'Cpected level ofinflation  5.465  1.821  5.407  1.786  ARIMA price increase forecast at the starting 
date ofthe negotiation process 
Regional wage increase signal  7.351  1.380  7.348  1.382  signed in the month preceding the starting date 
ofthe negotiation (%). (source: BEL) 
Employers reference  offer  4.342  1.011  4.316  1.013  emp10yers association's year1y prescription 
Unions reference e/aim  7.99  0.994  7.986  0.999  nationwide union's yearly prescription 
National unemployment rate  18.7  2.001  18.6  1.990  in percentage (source: EPA) 
Longterm (+2yr) unemployment  38.4  3.990  38.5  4.040  in percentage (source: EPA) 
Observations per BU  2  3  4  5  6  7 
elaim sample: BU  323  188  77  53  39  22 
Offer sample: BU  299  169  71  53  36  18 
Notes: 
a.  The selection criteria is such that the jirm rejects the initial claim￿ 
Sources:￿ 
NCGE: Negociacion Colectiva en las Grandes Empresas. Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda.￿ 
BEL: Boletin de Estadisticas Laborales, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales.￿ 
EPA: Encuesta de Poblacion Activa, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica.￿ 
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(3)  (4) 
coef. l-sl.  Coef. I-SI. 
-0.2251 (0.08)  -13.975 (5.30)￿ 
0.2074 (6.60)  0.1561  (4.84)￿ 
-0.0171  (0.96)  0.0054 (0.09)￿ 
-0.0105 (0.19)  0.1529 (0.86)￿ 
0.1858 (1.12)  -0.0261 (1.44)￿ 
0.1384 (0.90)  0.2506 (1.56)￿ 
0.5637 (2.22)  0.6916 (2.66)￿ 
0.1200 (0.43)  0.2188 (0.74)￿ 
0.4970 (1.93)  0.4429 (1.68)￿ 
0.1779 (0.70)  0.2564 (0.96)￿ 
-0.0045 (0.96)  -0.0049 (0.98)￿ 
0.2349 (3.08)  0.2240 (2.93)￿ 
-0.1517 (1.84)  -0.2321 (2.75)￿ 
-0.3141 (2.15)  -0.1327 (0.83)￿ 
0.4976 (1.63)  0.2674 (0.87)￿ 
0.0223 (0.40)  0.1001  (1.59)￿ 
0.0965 (3.79)  0.0642 (2.38)￿ 
0.0345 (0.33)  0.0653 (0.56)￿ 
-1.1 012 (2.15)  -1.2181 (2.32)￿ 
0.2805 (6.20)  0.4256 (10.4)￿ 





777.7(20)  1080.6(24) 
14.9(7)  20.3(7) 
377.9(5) 
66.98(67)  87.8(67) 
-5.41  -5.15 
-1.09  -1.10 